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The U.S. transportation system's dependence on foreign oil makes Middle Eastern energy security a vital strategic interest. With 4.6% of the world's population, the U.S. currently consumes 25% of the world's oil. 7 Transportation accounts for 68% of U.S. oil consumption and oil represents 96% of all fuels used for transportation. 8 Despite uninformed assertions to the contrary, U.S. independence from foreign oil is an impossibility for at least the next two decades. 9 The challenge is managing U.S.
dependence on oil while transitioning the economy to one less reliant on petroleum.
Supply "Peak oil" is the point at which global oil production can no longer increase to meet global demand, leaving declining reserves. Most studies estimate that global "peak oil" will occur before 2040, with a minority suggesting a later date. 10 Were global peak oil to occur in the near future, followed by a sharp decline in oil production (and the absence of alternative fuels to sustain U.S. transportation needs), a perfect storm would result: increased prices from competition would result in severe economic hardship and the potential for conflict. While no country would be immune to these consequences, the U.S. is highly vulnerable to any price shock because it is so heavily dependent on oil.
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Witness the rise of oil prices in 2008 to $150 per barrel as a major factor in the current recession.
The U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), reports that most non Middle Eastern countries are at or near peak conventional oil production. 12 While the United States is currently the third largest oil-producer in the world, U.S. output peaked in 1970 and has since declined steadily. 13 Diminishing reserves and increased global competition for
Middle Eastern oil makes access to Middle Eastern oil reserves a strategic imperative. 3 There is considerable debate about whether global energy supply can satisfy increasing demand. Despite widespread debate, the EIA estimates that global oil supply in 2030 will somehow match global oil demand at 118 million barrels per day. 14 Most energy professionals believe this is highly unrealistic. 15 Demand Affordable oil has underpinned American economic growth since World War II.
Continued access is at risk due to the specter of peak oil and increasing global energy demand. Since 1960 global oil consumption has grown four fold to 86 million barrels a day. 16 The EIA estimates global consumption will rise to 118 million barrels per day by 2030. 17 Rising global demand poses a significant strategic challenge for satisfying enormous U.S. dependency on oil. During the Arab oil embargo of 1973, the U.S.
imported 35% of its oil needs. In 2009, the U.S. imported 66% of its oil. 18 Industrialized countries account for approximately two-thirds of global energy consumption. 19 These mature economies are expected to grow at a relatively consumption. 31 By the end of the Bush administration, U.S. imports of foreign oil had risen to 66% of U.S. consumption. 32 The Bush administration's energy policy acknowledged the need for conservation and greater energy independence, yet emphasized production over reduced consumption. The Bush Administration is not the first to acknowledge the importance of energy conservation, but fail to make progress in achieving it. Despite four decades of declining U.S. oil production, increased reliance on foreign oil, crippling consequences of price shocks in 1973, 1979 and 2008 , and the ever-increasing cost, in blood and treasure, of a misdirected Middle Eastern foreign 7 policy -five successive Presidents have failed to address energy security in a thoughtful and sustained manner.
Shortcomings in Foreign Policy
There are two central problems with U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East:
increased militarization and a failure to address the root causes of political instability.
A. Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy. In the immediate wake of 9/11, the Bush administration published its National Security Strategy, reversing decades-old themes of U.S. foreign policy defined by containment, collective security, multilateralism, and détente to adopt a strategy of preventative war, unilateralism, and regime change.
Under the leadership Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense aggressively marginalized the State Department in diplomatic matters and the CIA in intelligence gathering and analysis, thereby empowering the Pentagon's ability to influence foreign policy. 33 The use of force was no longer the choice of last resort, but rather the panacea for all America's post 9/11 challenges. As Mark Twain once said, "To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail." 34 In its haste to respond to the unprecedented challenges presented by 9/11, the Bush administration committed to a military solution before it identified the problem. Despite eight years and a heroic military and civilian effort, America has few strategic victories to show for its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In fact, U.S. occupation of both countries has increased the level of political instability across the Middle East to unprecedented levels.
Both sides of the political aisle recognize the increased militarization of U.S. Reversing political instability is key to ensuring that Middle Eastern governments are willing and able to facilitate U.S. access to oil. 42 The regions rapid urbanization erodes governments' legitimacy in three ways: (i) infrastructure and government budgets are strained; (ii) the process of migrating from rural to urban settings is disorienting for migrants, providing fertile recruiting ground for Islamic militants; and (iii) urban discontent is more politically volatile and dangerous than rural discontent. 43 5. Rentier Effect: A rentier state is one that derives a large portion of its revenue from external rents. Author Michael Ross asserts that the taxation effect, spending effect and group formation effect constitute the rentier effect. 44 Taxation effect is when a country derives sufficient revenue from oil that it is less likely to tax its population and the public is less likely to demand accountability from and representation in their government. 45 Spending effect is when oil wealth leads to greater spending on patronage, which in turn dampens latent pressures for democratization. 46 Finally, group 10 formation effect is when oil wealth leads authoritarian governments to use their largesse to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent from the state and inclined to demand political rights. 47 The U.S. as a result is promoting democracy in a region whose governments are wedded to policies and a culture that are adverse to embracing democratic ideals. back investment at all levels. 49 As a result, the implications for the U.S. are two-fold.
First, the U.S. has to deal with governments rather than corporations, making it much more challenging to influence the region in ways that advance energy security. Second, rather than being motivated by profits, governments have numerous agendas that can 11 frustrate the U.S.'s ability to influence capacity related infrastructure investments, production levels and the price of oil. 50 Recommendations for Improving Middle Eastern Energy Security
Managing Middle Eastern energy security requires a two-prong approach that addresses both domestic and foreign policy. Ironically, some of the U.S.'s strongest leverage rests with its own domestic energy policy. A common theme with U.S. energy security over the past four decades has been "more" -increasing production to satisfy One of the most powerful catalysts for change in America is consumer behavior. Reversing profligacy requires that Americans accept the reality that a culture of unlimited consumption threatens energy security and national security. Americans must accept that solutions to U.S. energy security problems do not all rest with imposing the U.S.'s will upon the Middle East, but rather with reducing demand for oil here at home.
Reversing profligacy requires Americans to adopt a fundamentally different outlook on the value of efficiency and more importantly, on reducing consumption. for the 143-year-old theory, applying it to modern systems and cogently arguing that an understanding of the theory is imperative to a prudent energy policy. 51 Jevons paradox states that improved efficiency will actually lead to increased consumption as long as the demand for consumption remains unlimited. 52 For instance, the increased fuel efficiency of vehicles in the 1980s and 90s led to an increase in miles driven per car as people desired to drive more due to the savings. 53 The paradox suggests improvements in efficiency without a corresponding decrease in consumption will defeat transportation sector transformation.
Reversing profligacy and reducing consumption run the risk of failure because changing consumer behavior and long-standing cultural norms will face stiff resistance in the form of apathy and embedded interests. Apathy due to ignorance or indifference will be difficult to overcome if oil prices fall and the financial incentive to change spending behavior no longer exists. Embedded commercial interests that benefit from unlimited consumption will lobby hard for status quo. Politicians that rely on the same powerful commercial interests to fund their campaign war chests will be reluctant to embrace change at the risk of losing financial support. In addition to the risk of failure due to apathy and embedded commercial interests as discussed above, transforming the transportation sector also risks failure because it may not progress quickly enough, depending on when global peak oil occurs, 15 to have a meaningful affect on energy security. Obstacles such as falling gasoline prices, long life cycles of existing vehicles, the absence of a proven replacement technology and the long lead times to manufacture and deploy next generation vehicles and associated infrastructure may stall transformation.
C. Synchronizing Domestic and Foreign Policy. The absence of a synchronized energy strategy is jeopardizing the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy and national security. The DOE has echoed, "there is no formal strategy to coordinate and prioritize federal programs and activities dealing with peak oil issues -either within DOE or between DOE and other key agencies". 56 Unity of purpose will result in unity of effort and will require sustained Presidential and Congressional leadership. President
Obama's appointment of Carol Browner as "Energy Coordinator" appears to be a step in the right direction, but published accounts suggests this position lacks the authority to effect unifying change. 57 It is imperative that the President appoint a Director of National Energy Affairs (DNEA). Much like the recently created Director of National Intelligence, the DNEA would be the President's, the National Security Council's and National Economic Council's chief advisor on energy affairs. The DNEA would provide oversight of the numerous federal agencies involved in energy matters and be responsible for the implementation of all aspects of energy policy, at home and abroad. Unity of leadership is necessary to synchronize policy efforts. Synchronization between domestic and foreign policy is necessary to focus on a more strategic and comprehensive long-term approach to energy security. Although the federal government has a critical role in directing energy policy, it is incapable of solving all U.S. energy security challenges itself. Thus, in addition to synchronizing federal efforts, the DNEA should foster new 16 relationships with the private sector. The focus should be on providing public-private partnerships, grants, tax incentives, low interest loans, as well as creating a favorable regulatory environment that marshals private-sector R&D and capital necessary to deploy the next generation of transportation technology.
Attempts to unify energy leadership may be ineffective because appointing a Afghanistan and Iraq. 59 Recent studies have reported that there is no region of the world where U.S. standing has fallen further or more precipitously than in the Middle East. 60 To restore America's reputation, influence, and ability to ensure Middle Eastern energy security, the U.S. should embrace a smart power approach to Middle Eastern foreign policy.
Smart power is relatively new to the lexicon of foreign and domestic policy and has received increased attention over the past two years. 
Conclusion
While the U.S. can and should work towards energy independence, it is not likely to achieve it any time soon. In the interim, the U.S. is dependent on the Middle East for maintaining energy security and therefore must protect its vital interest in the region. To this end, the U.S. must establish unity of purpose and unity of effort in synchronizing foreign and domestic energy policy. Success at home requires a sustained effort of conservation and the transformation of transportation sector. In the Middle East, success requires reprioritizing security and stability over democratization, and it demands that the U.S. address political instability with its full range of smart power resources. 
